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Available online 22 April 2016AbstractAll the important events of the accident of nitrogen drilling of Well Qionglai 1 have been speculated and analyzed in the paper I. In this paper
II, based on the investigating information, the well log data and some calculating and simulating results, according to the analysis method of the
fault tree of safe engineering, the every possible compositions, their possibilities and time schedule of the events of the accident of Well Qionglai
1 have been analyzed, the implications of the logging data have been revealed, the process of the accident of Well Qionglai 1 has been restored.
Some important understandings have been obtained: the objective causes of the accident is the rock burst and the induced events form rock burst,
the subjective cause of the accident is that the blooie pipe could not bear the flow burden of the clasts from rock burst and was blocked by the
clasts. The blocking of blooie pipe caused high pressure in wellhead, the high pressure made the blooie pipe burst, natural gas came out and
flared fire. This paper also thinks that the rock burst in gas drilling in fractured tight sandstone gas zone is objective and not avoidable, but the
accidents induced from rock burst can be avoidable by improving the performance of the blooie pipe, wellhead assemblies and drilling tool
accessories aiming at the downhole rock burst.
© 2016 Sichuan Petroleum Administration. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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gration; Accident1. The accident of Well Qionglai 1's nitrogen drilling
In general nitrogen drilling for enhancing ROP in tight gas
zone whose production is none or low is safe, no risk of un-
controlled blowout or deflagration accident. This kind of ni-
trogen drilling has been successfully and safely applied in many
wells in China, no blowout or deflagration accident ever
occurred. However, a wild blowout fire suddenly occurred* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: cwctmyf@swpu.edu.cn (Meng YF).
Peer review under responsibility of Sichuan Petroleum Administration.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ngib.2016.03.003
2352-8540/© 2016 Sichuan Petroleum Administration. Production and hosting by
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).during nitrogen drilling in Well Qionglai 1 at 03:27 on 22
December 2011, which was the first blowout fire accident
occurred in nitrogen drilling in China. In order to get a correct
and systematic understanding of this accident, an experts group
was organized and the studies and analysis of the accident have
been done. In the paper I, all major inducement events of the
accident have been speculated. This paper II will focus on the
restoration of the accident process and lessons learned.
2. Possible events and sequences of the accident
The whole accident is a time series of a chain of events
lined up based on causality. In some cases, the causality is oneElsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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of drilling string is consequently unfrozen, and the compres-
sion deformation of it is consequently released. In some cases,
the causality is not one to one, e.g., sand bridge sticking might
occur at the bit or at the centralizer, but the subsequent event
evolution of them would be different. In such a case, the an-
alytic method of event tree (or fault tree) [1] should be
adopted: list various possible events and their subsequent
evolution events one by one, reflect various potential evolution
paths in tree structure based on causality and time sequence,
allow each evolution path from its origin to terminal to
correspond to a hazard level coefficient, and the greater the
coefficient, the more serious the accident consequence is; if an
event is followed by several possible events, allow each
possible event to have its own occurrence probability, and the
greater the probability, the greater the occurrence possibility
is. Then, find a path with the maximum cumulative probability
in the event tree, which corresponds to the most probable event
sequence and its consequence of the accident.
The constitution of event tree of the accident is shown in
Fig. 1.
The first bridging-off can only occur at the bit, and there is
no other possibility. The second and third bridging-offs can
occur either at the centralizer or at the bit. Once the bridging-
off is destroyed, the compression deformation of the drilling
string is consequently partially released, the bit would rush
down; the down rushing bit might directly rush to the top of
the settled sands and stop, or might stop before long due to the
sand bridge sticking resulted during the down-moving of the
centralizer and high-speed up-moving of clasts.
Besides, the total volume of clasts ejected upward at the
destruction of third bridging-off is different to some extent in
different cases: if the bridging-off occurs at the bit every time,
the total volume of clasts ejected upward at the destruction of
the third bridging-off would be the sum of the sand bridge clasts
of the three bridging-offs; if the second and third bridging-offs
occur at the centralizer, the total volume of clasts ejected up-
ward at the destruction of the third bridging-off would be the
sum of clasts of the second and third sand bridge-offs. If there
are too many settled clasts above the sticking point, it is hard to
prevent sand-sticking from occurring during drilling string
lifting; if there are too many clasts at the sticking point and too
many settled clasts above the sticking point, the total volume of
clasts during sand bridge destructionwould be too large to allow
them to get enough initial kinetic energy and arrive at the
wellhead ahead of the natural gas; therefore, “too many settled
clasts above the sticking point” is hard to be consistent with the
actual performance of the accident.
In terms of the accident of Well Qionglai 1, no matter what
the evolution path is, the consequence is all catastrophic,
therefore, the hazard level coefficients were not presented in
the event tree shown in Fig. 1. In addition, some impossible
events in probability (e.g., fire directly triggered by the
piercement on the straight segment of the blooie pipe) were
also omitted in the event tree for the purpose of simplification.
Based on an integrated analysis, during down rushing of the
bit, the possibility for the centralizer to be stuck is strongerthan that for the bit to directly rush to the top of the settled
sands. The possibility for the second and third bridging-offs to
occur at the centralizer is stronger than that for them to occur
at the bit. Therefore, the most probable event path is the fourth
path (the bottom one) in the event tree shown in Fig. 1.
3. Restoration analysis of the accident process3.1. Restoration of the accident processThe 2 s interval log data of a 3 minus period from 17 s
before the accident to the stable blowout in the accident were
played back, as shown in Fig. 2. Combined with the interview
record of the accident process, the post-accident investigation
data and the necessary computation and numerical simulation
analysis results, important data and phenomena (represented
by States A, B, C, etc.) were marked on the figure, and the
sketch of each important phenomenon was shown as in Fig. 3.
The accident process as per event-time sequence is restored
as follows:
1) State A: Normal drilling.
AeB time interval in Fig. 2 and the state of Fig. 3-a show
the normal drilling under the circumstances of continuous
trace gas flow rate (when the nitrogen injection rate was
120 m3/min, the total hydrocarbon content was 4%, corre-
sponding to gas flow rate of 7000 m3/d). At about 03:27:16,
the bit started to approach a fracture in tight sandstone.
2) State B: Severe rock burst occurred, resulting in the
formation of first bridging-off at the bit.
As shown in Fig. 3-b1, at that time, the bottom hole pres-
sure (BHP) was 0.36 MPa, whereas the gas pressure in the
fracture was up to 30 MPa. When the wellbore was close
enough to the fracture, the strength of rock wall between the
fracture and the wellbore was insufficient to resist the
destructive power formed by high differential pressure be-
tween the fracture and the wellbore, the rock wall burst apart
instantly, and “rock burst” occurred (point B in Fig. 2 and the
state in Fig. 3-b2).
On the right side of point B in Fig. 2, as shown in Fig. 3-b2,
substantial clasts were ejected into the wellbore ahead of
natural gas at a very high speed and first formed blockage at
the bit, forming and compacting sand bridge, called as the first
bridging-off, and drilling tool being stuck. It is known from
computation that the force of formation pressure acting on the
sand bridge was 2400 kN. It is also known from log data that
the upthrust of sand bridge acting on the bit was 745.6 kN
(weight on hook dropped from 772.3 kN to 26.7 kN, the force
on the bit was too much and caused the weight indicator to act
up). Therefore, the self-locking friction of sand bridge was
about 1650 kN. It is known from computation that the upthrust
caused the bit to move up for 17 m (drill pipe compression
deformation and spiral buckling) [2]. The formation of sand
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Fig. 2. Composite drilling logging data analysis of the accident process.
Fig. 3. Sketch of main states of the accident process (Green-Nitrogen, Yellow-Gas)
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569Meng YF et al. / Natural Gas Industry B 2 (2015) 565e574completed within 1 s; because the sampling time of drilling
logging was 2 s, the upthrust phenomenon recorded was 2 s.
The evidences that “a clash sound between the swivel and the
hook was heard, and the deflexion of kelly, the rotational
swing of traveling block and swivel and the violent swing of
weight indicator pointer were observed” in the interview re-
cord all reflect that rock burst upthrusted and jacked up the
entire drilling string.
3) State C: The first bridging-off at the bit was destroyed,
resulting in the formation of the second bridging-off at
the centralizer.
As shown in Fig. 3-c and at BeC time interval in Fig. 2, the
sand bridge at the bit was in a stable state for about 16 s.
During that period, the rotary table rotated at a constant rate of
30 rpm for 12 s (torsional deformation for 6 circles in total),
and a rotary torque was generated at the sand bridge. Under
the coaction of the shearing force generated by the torque and
vertical differential pressure, the sand bridge at the bit was
suddenly destroyed [3]. The “gas cannon” effect made the
compression energy of high-pressure gas under the bridge be
converted into kinetic energy of sand bridge clasts, causing
high-speed upward ejection of sand bridge clasts accompanied
by drill pipe release (instant release of torsional deformation,
exhibiting sudden jump of rotation rate, on the left side of
point C in Fig. 2, and instant release of compression defor-
mation, exhibiting bit and centralizer suddenly moved down).
The clasts ejected upward formed bridging-off at the central-
izer, i.e., the second bridging-off, and the drilling string was
stuck once more (exhibiting sudden drop of rotation rate, on
the right side of point C in Fig. 2). At that time, substantial
clasts exhibited loose accumulation above and below the bit. It
is known from log data that at that time, the weight on hook
rose from 76.3 kN to 311.8 kN, the upthrust acting on the
centralizer was 504 kN (at that time, the display of weight
indicator was restored). It is also known from computation that
the drill string deformation displacement resulted from drilling
tool upthrust was 8.8 m [2]. In the interview record that “a
clash sound between the swivel and the hook was heard,/,
another clash was heard before long”, the second clash should
be the reflection of the second upthrust of the drilling string.
4) State D: The second bridging-off at the centralizer was
destroyed, resulting in the formation of the third
bridging-off at the centralizer.
At CeD time interval in Fig. 2, as shown in Fig. 3-d1, the
second bridging-off was in a stable state for 12 s. During that
period, the drill string suffered 6 circles of torsional defor-
mation in total, and a torque was generated at the sand bridge.
Under the coaction of the rotary torque and vertical differen-
tial pressure, the bridging-off at the centralizer was suddenly
destroyed, causing a high-speed upward ejection of sand
bridge clasts due to the resulted “gas cannon” effect and being
accompanied by drill pipe release, and instant release of
torsional deformation (exhibiting a sudden jump of rotationrate) and compression deformation (the centralizer suddenly
moved down). When the high-concentration sloughing matter
below the centralizer moved upward and the centralizer moved
downwards, a self-locking effect around the centralizer
happened by the chips between the centralizer and the well
wall, bridging-off was formed once more, which was called
the third bridging-off, as shown at CeD time interval in Fig. 2,
and the drilling tool was stuck once more (exhibiting sudden
drop of rotation rate, on the left side of point D in Fig. 2). It is
known from drilling logging data that the weight on hook was
restored from 312.50 to 450 kN, the upthrust displayed on
weight indicator was 366 kN (at the centralizer). It is esti-
mated by computation that the deformation displacement
resulted from the upthrust was about 5.6 m [2].
After the second bridging-off was destroyed, the clasts at
the centralizer were ejected upward at a very high speed,
simultaneously, a few high-pressure gas below the centralizer
expanded and entered the space above it; however, the third
bridging-off was formed and compacted instantly at the
centralizer, and the tight sand bridge again formed a bridging-
off state with low pressure above the centralizer (weight of
static nitrogen column) and high pressure below it (formation
pore pressure). After the second bridging-off was destroyed,
although the clasts at the centralizer were ejected upward into
the wellbore at a very high speed, because the nitrogen above
the centralizer in the wellbore was still, these particles,
decelerating rapidly due to the impedance of nitrogen and the
collision with each other and sidewall, started to fall after
having moved upward for about hundreds of meters and
settled on the centralizer, forming loose accumulation, as
shown in Fig. 3-d2.
5) State E: The third bridging-off was destroyed, making
the whole annulus unblocked and gas carrying rock burst
clasts start to move up.
The third bridging-off was in a stable state for 8 s, as shown
by DeE time interval in Fig. 2. At 03:27:57, the driller started
to gear down and lift the drilling string. Under the coaction of
the rising drilling tool, rotary torque and high differential
pressure, the third bridging-off was destroyed, corresponded
by point E in Fig. 2. As shown in Fig. 3-e1, the “gas cannon”
effect made the sand bridge particles at the centralizer be
ejected upward at a very high initial velocity, simultaneously,
the upthrust at the centralizer disappeared, accompanied by
the release of drilling string compression deformation, the bit
down-rushing and approaching the bottom hole; the weight
indicator showed that the force on the bit and the centralizer
was zero.
The low-pressure nitrogen slug (green in the figure) above
the centralizer was connected to the high-pressure gas slug
(yellow in the figure) below it. The natural gas compressed at
high pressure below the centralizer started to expand, and
pushed the low pressure nitrogen above the centralizer to be
compressed and move. Because the drilling string was in a
continuously rising state, fixed bridging-off would not be
formed due to the self-unlocking effect around the centralizer,
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to move in a slug mode, the gases (nitrogen and natural gas) in
the whole annulus started to be in a flow state, and the flowing
velocity gradually increased, as shown in Fig. 3-e2.
After the third bridging-off was destroyed, the clasts
moving upward in the annulus could be divided into two parts.
The first part was composed of the centralizer sand bridge
particles formed during the third bridging-off destruction and
the particles generated during the second bridging-off
destruction and then settled on the top of the centralizer,
which was called the first stream of clasts; these particles
obtained very high initial velocity at the sudden collapse of the
sand bridge, which made these particles rise for hundreds of
meters instantly; afterward, the gases in the whole wellbore
flew at a very high speed, and then carried these particles to go
on moving upward. The second part was composed of the
particles loosely accumulated below the centralizer during the
third bridging-off destruction; the high-pressure natural gas in
the formation fracture passed them and formed blowdown
flow; when the flow rate was large enough to form large
enough dynamic differential pressure, the loose sand bridge
was carried away layer by layer, which was called the second
stream of clasts. The distance between the first stream of clasts
and the second stream of clasts was hundreds of meters away.
So the flowing matters in the wellbore in the order from top
to bottom were following: a long slug of nitrogen, the first
stream of clasts in nitrogen, a nitrogen slug again, a short slug
of natural gas, the second stream of clasts in natural gas, a long
slug of natural gas. The first stream of clasts is shorter and
denser, the second stream of clasts is longer and sparser.
This period corresponds to the EeF time interval in Fig. 2.
The pressure in the wellbore gradually reduced, and the weight
on hook gradually increased (at that time, some external forces
still acted on the drilling tool and counteracted partial weight
on hook: one was the pressure in the wellbore, and the second
was the impact force of transient flow of gas and solid mixed
fluid to the drilling tool).
6) State F: The blooie pipe was partially blocked, resulting
in pressure rise in the wellbore.
14 s after the third bridging-off was destroyed, the first
stream of clasts arrived at the wellhead, making the first 900 T
joint with a cecum-end on the blooie pipe partially blocked,
which is corresponded by point F in Fig. 2. At FeG time
interval of Fig. 2, because the blooie pipe was partially and
gradually blocked, the flow resistance caused the pressure in
the wellbore to rise gradually, and thus caused the weight on
hook to stop rising, or even start to drop gradually. Due to the
partly blocked, the velocity of the gases flow in the wellbore
decreased gradually, but the moving clasts were still moving
fast because of their inertia.
7) State G: The 600 T-joint on the RCD was pierced.
The irrational structure of the 600 T-joint made it suffer
severe erosion in the long-term of normal drilling; when thefirst stream of high-concentration sand particles arrived at the
wellhead at high speed, the erosion at this point was aggra-
vated, so the eroded part became very thin, but was not
completely pierced. After the first 900 T-joint with a cecum-end
on the blooie pipe was partially blocked, the pressure in the
wellbore increased rapidly, and ultimately caused the weakest
point to be pierced in a burst mode at high pressure, which is
corresponded by point G in Fig. 2. The “everted perforation
edge” photo (see Fig. 8 in the paper I) is the evidence of burst
under high pressure, and the interview record that “piercing
sound was heard at the wellsite, below the drill floor dust was
observed” is the direct proof of piercement. After the pierce-
ment, nitrogen in the wellbore was quickly released, causing
the pressure in the wellbore to drop, and thus causing the
weight on hook to stop dropping and start to rise, as shown on
the right side of G point of Fig. 2. With the second stream of
clasts in the wellbore arriving at the wellhead, substantial
clasts and dusts suddenly came to the partially-blocked 900 T-
joint, and were rapidly accumulated and compacted there,
which caused the partial blockage to suddenly become com-
plete blockage, causing the pressure in the wellbore to rapidly
and sharply rise once more; the fact that the weight on hook
stopped rising and started to drop again, as shown in the GeH
time interval in Fig. 2, is an evidence of pressure rise in the
wellbore.
8) State H: The wired hose burst and the 600 T-joint fell off.
Because fluid-structure coupled vibration occurred at the
wired hose in the long-term normal drilling, and the alternate
load of vibration caused the wires in the hose to suffer fatigue
fracture and damage, thus significantly reducing the bearing
capacity of the wired hose. After the blooie pipe was blocked,
the pressure in the wellbore ceaselessly rose, and finally
exceeded the residual bearing capacity of the wired hose,
resulting in the hose burst; simultaneously, the tremendous
recoil made the 600 T-joint subjected to the action of sudden
bending moment; under the coaction of recoil bending
moment and pressure in the wellbore, the thread of the 600 T-
joint suffered asymmetric deformation and elastic slip, and the
T-joint was separated from the 900 to 600 bell joint on the RCD,
which is corresponded by point H in Fig. 2. There is such a
description that “piercing sound was heard at wellsite, and
dust pervaded below the drill floor./.A dull blare was heard a
few seconds later (the time for a logger to run more than
20 m)” among the interview evidences collected by the expert
panel, “dull blare” should be the common sound of the hose
burst and the 600 T-joint falling-off, which occurred about 10 s
after piercement. After the hose burst, the driller stopped the
rotation of the rotary table.
9) State I: Natural gas deflagrated at the wellsite.
After the 600 T-joint falling-off, the wellbore was instantly
unblocked; the high-pressure nitrogen carrying particles blew
out of the side outlet of the rotary control head substantially;
pressure in the wellbore stopped rising and turned to dropping,
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this state is corresponded by HeI time interval in Fig. 2. Gases
in the wellbore rapidly flew out; after the residual nitrogen in
the wellbore was exhausted, the natural gas started to flow out
of the wellhead at high speed, and instantly permeated the
lower part of the drill floor; simultaneously, the high-speed gas
flow mixed with the sand particles collided with the steel, and
the resulted spark triggered the deflagration of natural gas. The
sudden deflagration made a pressure jumping in the wellbore
which caused a dropping of the weight on hook, as shown as
the section IeJ of Fig. 2.
10) State J: Relatively stable blowout and combustion.
After the deflagration of natural gas at the wellsite, the
driller stopped hoisting the drilling tool, and all the personnel
evacuated. The natural gas carrying the residual clasts in the
wellbore went on blowing out of the 900 to 600 bell joint on the
side outlet of the RCD and burning, forming a relatively stable
blowout state. The gas produced from the well was flowing out
to air, the clasts remained in the wellbore were gradually
cleaned out, the pressure in the wellbore decreased slightly
and the weight on hook increased gradually and slightly, as
shown as right side of the point “J” of Fig. 2. At the time of
3:29:10, the fire damaged the logging sensors, the logging
stopped.
Until the clasts in the wellbore were evacuated clearly, the
unsteady flow of gasesolid two phase was weakened to a
steady single phase flow of pure gas in the wellbore, the flow
rate of the natural gas was about 1  106 m3/d, which was the
situation of hours later, not shown in the logging data.3.2. Secondary evidences of the “wellbore bridging-off
and blooie pipe bridging-off”When the total hydrocarbon gas (for short TG, Total Gas)
logging in the course of the accident was played back, which
is shown in Fig. 4: the total hydrocarbon had been about 4% in
the normal drilling before the rock burst, and had all along
been maintained about 4% in the whole course of the accident;
it did not change obviously until 1 min after the wellsite hadFig. 4. Interpretation of the total hydrocarbon gas logging in the course of the
accident.been on fire and dropped to zero 3 min later. What does this
phenomenon show?
As mentioned in the paper I, in the course of the first,
second and third bridging-offs in the wellbore, the spaces
below and above the sand bridges were isolated; apart from
hundreds of milliseconds of gas shock wave, the space above
the sand bridge was filled by still nitrogen column with 4%
TG. After the third bridging-off was destroyed, the first rise of
the first stream of clasts (inclusive of the particles of the third
bridging-off and the particles of the second bridging-off
settled on the top of the centralizer) resulted from an up-
ward ejection of clasts at very high initial velocity after kinetic
energy was obtained due to the release of the high-pressure gas
under the bridging-off; the second rise of the first stream of
clasts resulted from the carrying kinetic energy of annulus
moving nitrogen. During the second rise of the first stream of
clasts, the flowing natural gas carrying the second stream of
clasts (particles settled below the centralizer due to gravity)
started to move upward. Therefore, the distance between the
first stream of clasts and the second stream of clasts was
hundreds of meters away.
14 s after the third bridging-off was destroyed, the first
stream of clasts arrived at the wellhead and immediately
resulted in the blockage of the first 900 T-joint with a cecum-
end on the blooie pipe. So gases in the wellbore stopped
flowing and became compressed. Besides, the interface of
natural gas and nitrogen also stopped moving upward, but the
second stream of clasts still moved up at high speed by
inertia, and moved from the natural gas slug into the nitrogen
slug. Another 4 s later, the 600 T-joint was pierced, resulting in
ejected nitrogen with 4% TG. The pressure in wellbore started
to drop. At this time, the interface of natural gas and nitrogen
moved upward slowly due to the blowing of nitrogen out of
the perforation. 10 more seconds later, the second stream of
clasts successively arrived at the wellhead due to inertial
motion and made the first 900 T-joint to be blocked from partly
to totally, the pressure in the wellbore started to rise again.
28 s after the third bridging-off was destroyed, the wired hose
burst and the 600 T-joint fell off, so the wellbore was instantly
unblocked. The gases in the wellbore rapidly flew out of the
900 to 600 bell joint, and the interface of natural gas and ni-
trogen moved up rapidly; about 2e4 s later, the residual ni-
trogen in the wellbore was exhausted, so the natural gas
started to flow out of the wellhead at high speed, and instantly
permeated the lower part of the drill floor. Simultaneously, the
sands mixed with the high-speed natural gas flow collided
with the steel, generating spark and triggering natural gas
deflagration.
Obviously, during the period from the occurrence of rock
burst to the blockage of the blooie pipe, natural gas in the
wellbore did not flow out of the wellhead, therefore, the gases
at the gas logging sampling point of the blooie pipe was al-
ways the original nitrogen with 4% TG. After the blooie pipe
was blocked, it broke before long; thereafter, although the
natural gas in the wellbore blew out of the wellhead and
permeated the wellsite, because the blooie pipe had already
been broken and still blocked, the natural gas at the wellsite
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from the blocking of the line to the fire-catching of the well-
site, the gas at the gas logging sampling point of the blooie
pipe was always the nitrogen with 4% TG. Therefore, from the
starting of rock burst to the fire-catching of the wellsite, the
gas logging TG value was always about 4%. After the wellsite
caught fire 2 min later, because the concentration difference of
methane on the wellsite and in the blooie pipe resulted in
diffusion and convection, the methane concentration in the
blooie pipe started to drop, another 3 min later, the methane
concentration in the blooie pipe dropped to zero. This indi-
rectly proves the rationality of such speculation as “wellbore
bridging-off and blooie pipe blocked”.
4. “Rock burst” and gas drilling safety
The “rock burst” phenomenon similar to that occurred in
Well Qionglai 1 has not been reported in any available foreign
literature, or has not been talked about by the foreign coun-
terparts, either. Then, whether the rock burst accident in Well
Qionglai 1 is an awfully peculiar isolated event? The answer
should be no.
In 2008, when nitrogen drilling was being conducted in
Well Longgang 001-12 in the Sichuan Basin, downhole burst
accident with undefined causes occurred, and it resulted in the
burst and break of the blooie pipe. After the burst and break of
the blooie pipe, the well was immediately shut in and killed, so
no subsequent accidents occurred. In the course of drilling,
nitrogen generation equipment was in good condition, so the
accident should not have been resulted from the deflagration of
natural gas in the wellbore. The blooie pipe of the well was
similar to that of Well Qionglai 1, i.e., there was a T-joint right
angle bend with bune cap, therefore, it is speculated now that
downhole rock burst might have occurred, and the resulted
high pressure due to the rock burst clast blockage at the T-
joint, and caused the blooie pipe to burst.
It is also noticed that in Well Qionglai 1, when nitrogen
drilling was conducted to a well depth of 1003.1 m, the total
hydrocarbon content rose suddenly from 4% to 40%, so the
blooie pipe was ignited successfully, with flame being 7e8 m
high; simultaneously, the standpipe pressure rose from 1.4 to
7.6 MPa; after POOH, one of the nozzles of the air hammer
bit was blocked which was obviously also a slight rock burst
accompanied by a small gas flow. In 2012, in the nitrogen
drilling of Well Niudong 102 in the Huabei oilfield,
accompanied by a small flowing out of gas, about 40 kN
upthrust impact force occurred on the bit, so this should also
be a slight rock burst. It was said by a counterpart that in the
nitrogen drilling of Well Gushen 3 of the Daqing oilfield in
2012, during the producing of a small flow of gas, the bit
nozzle was blocked. In retrospect, such phenomena as a
small gas flow rate simultaneously accompanied by bit
bouncing, sticking, jumping and nozzle blocking are rela-
tively universal in gases drilling in the western Sichuan
Basin, especially the downhole accident occurred in gases
drilling of Well Xin 3 in 2006. All these were paid attention
to by people at that time, but because the existence of rockburst was not identified, the wellbore instability accompanied
by a sudden gas flow was boiled down to fluid and solid
coupling sidewall spalling due to formation gas production
[4]. Now it seems that all these should be the results of
different degrees of rock burst.
Therefore, slight rock burst should universally exist in the
implementation of gas drilling in tight sand gas zones, and
severe rock burst similar to those occurred in Well Longgang
001-12 and Well Qionglai 1 would also take place occasion-
ally. Simply because severe rock burst resulting in great haz-
ards has never been encountered before, it is not paid enough
attention to. After the fatal accident in Well Qionglai 1, a close
investigation and analysis on it was immediately organized; it
is fortunate that various data and 2 s log data of the relevant
well interval are complete, so the rock burst phenomenon and
a series of events resulted from it can be analyzed.
After the accident in Well Qionglai 1, gas drilling safety
has been questioned, and the application of gas drilling has
also been reduced largely. Is gas drilling definitely unsafe and
bound to be forbidden under the circumstances of potential
rock burst? It is conceivable that if the blooie pipe of Well
Qionglai 1 had been upgraded by some anti-blocking tech-
nical measures, the pipe would not have been blocked in rock
burst, and the subsequent hose burst, uncontrolled blowout of
natural gas and deflagration of the wellsite would not have
occurred. If the blooie pipe of Well Qionglai 1 had been
upgraded by some anti-erosion technical measures, the pipe
would not have been eroded and pierced in drilling, the ac-
cident potential of gas leakage and fire at the wellsite would
not have existed. It can also imagine that if the shape of the
downhole hammer bit had not packed the wellbore like mill
shoe, but rather had relatively smooth flow channel, blockage
would not have been easily formed at the bit by rock burst
clasts; if there were no centralizer or the centralizer had fluent
flow channel, blockage would not have been easily formed at
the centralizer either; in this way, the state in the wellbore
would be smoother in rock burst, and state on the ground
would be gentler. Furthermore, if relevant studies had been
conducted on the occurring mechanism, condition and law of
rock burst, and then the downhole tool, operating procedure,
wellhead equipment and blooie pipe would have been
improved, and the means like surface monitoring and early
warning aiming at rock burst would also have been increased.
Ultimately the safety of gases drilling under rock burst cir-
cumstances would be certain to be guaranteed. Therefore, the
existence of rock burst is objective and inevitable, but the
accident induced by rock burst is not inevitable, and can be
overcome by means of human effort.
Then, why has the rock burst in drilling never been reported
in the literature of foreign drilling industry?
Firstly, rock burst would not occur in the conventional
drilling of wellbore filled with fluid. Because the fluid column
pressure in the wellbore is balanced with the pore pressure in
formation, there is no differential pressure between them;
furthermore, even if underbalanced drilling is adopted, and
there is differential pressure, the differential pressure is not
high enough to induce the rock burst. Therefore, rock burst
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liquid drilling.
Secondly, air drilling has been popular in North America
since the 1950s, why is there no rock burst ever reported?
Could it be that gas drilling in North America has never
encountered rock burst? Now that at the time of encountering
the fracture of tight sand gas zones in gas drilling, rock burst is
an inevitable phenomenon of objective existence, gas drilling
in North America must have encountered many times of rock
burst, then, why is there no relevant report? The probable
reason is that when gas drilling occurred in North America in
the 1950s, air drilling was avoided for drilling in the formation
of natural gas, as a result, rock burst was avoided. At the
beginning of the 21st century, with the application of nitrogen
generation technique of membrane separation, nitrogen dril-
ling was used to drill out the hydrocarbon formations. How-
ever, large, straight, open and steady blooie pipe were
recommend and applied in North America at the very start [5],
as shown in Fig. 5.
The basic requirements of this type of blooie pipe are as
follows: large e the flow channel area of the pipe should not
be 1.1 times smaller than annular area; straight e the pipe
should decline at 10e15, and should be straight and un-
bending; open e the flow channel should be open and
unblocked inside; and steady e the bracket should be steady.
When this type of blooie pipe is applied, it would not be
blocked when encountering rock burst, therefore, accidents
would not occur. Although rock burst might have occurred in
gases drilling in North America, no hazards and accidents
have ever taken place, so rock burst has never been paid
attention to, and there is no studies and reports on rock burst.
This is nothing but a speculation, and the specific reasons
remain to be further studied.Fig. 5. The blooie pipe for gas drilling recommended by the American Gas
Research Institute.5. Conclusions
1) The accident process was completely restored mainly
based on the 2 s log data in the accident, the interview
record of the accident process, the post-accident inves-
tigation data, and the necessary computation and nu-
merical simulation analysis results.2) The restored accident process as following: Firstly,
downhole “rock burst” suddenly occurred in normal
drilling. Secondly, rock burst clasts formed bridging-offs
and sticking at the bit or at the centralizer; under the
circumstances of continuous rotation and action of
drilling tool, the bridging-offs were destroyed. Thirdly,
the bridging-off was formed and destroyed repeatedly,
until it was no longer formed in the whole annulus, and
the clasts and gas flew upward in the unblocked annulus.
Fourthly, some clasts arrived at the wellhead ahead of
the natural gas; large stream of clasts suddenly coming
to the wellhead blocked the blooie pipe, so the wellhead
pressure increased rapidly, and caused the wired hose to
burst and the outlet 600 T-joint to fall off. And finally, the
nitrogen in wellbore was instantly exhausted, the gas in
the wellbore rapidly blew out of the outlet of the RCD
and triggered deflagration.
3) The objective causes of the fatal accident in nitrogen
drilling of Well Qionglai 1 lie in that infrequent fracture
was encountered in gas drilling of the tight sandstone
formation, and severe “rock burst” occurred; whereas
the subjective causes lie in that the blooie pipe was
inadaptable to the large stream of clasts resulted from
“rock burst”, and was blocked, so high pressure was
formed, which caused the blooie pipe to break, resulting
in uncontrolled blowout and fire.
4) The lessons and inspirations obtained from the accident
are as follows: if bridging-off had not occurred at the bit
and the centralizer, the violent solid load impact in
ground blooie pipe would not have been exerted; if the
blooie pipe had not been blocked, hose burst and break
would not have occurred, and such type of fatal acci-
dents would not have occurred, either; if the outlet T-
joint had not been eroded and pierced, the risk of natural
gas leakage and fire at the wellsite would not have
existed. Therefore, it is the fundamentality of preventing
such type of rock burst induced accidents to improve the
performance of blooie pipe, wellhead assemblies and
drilling tool accessories aiming at the downhole rock
burst.
5) In gas drilling in fractured tight sandstone gas zones,
the existence of rock burst is objective and inevitable,
but the accident induced by rock burst is not inevitable,
and can be avoided by means of improving the per-
formance of blooie pipe, wellhead assemblies and
drilling tool accessories aiming at the downhole rock
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